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Dipak Patel v. The Minister of Finance and the Attorney General CCZ 5 of 2020 [2021]
Chanda Chungu 1
Facts
The Constitutional Court judgment of Dipak Patel v. The Minister of Finance and the Attorney
General dealt with an application by Dipak Patel who sought, inter alia, a declaration that the
failure by the Minister of Finance to bring all public debt that was contracted by the Executive
to the National Assembly for approval was contrary to the Constitution. This case review seeks
to provide a lucid and clear analysis of the Constitutional Court judgment, discussing the
soundness of the court’s reasoning and approach to the issue of how public debt should be
contracted.
Holding
Article 63(2)(d) of the Constitution reads as follows: (2) The National Assembly shall oversee the performance of executive functions by—
(d) approving public debt before it is contracted;
The majority decision of the Constitutional Court stated that the purpose of Article 63(2)(d) of
the Constitution was to merely assign the function of approving public debt before it is
contracted to the National Assembly but the substantive provisions on borrowing and lending
are set out in Article 207.
The court confirmed the Constitution does not support any assertion that Cabinet has the power
to approve contracting of debt. Notwithstanding this statement based on an interpretation of
Article 114(1)(e) of the Constitution, the court went on to hold that based on Article 207 of the
Constitution, legislation should be enacted to stipulate the details of the category, nature, and
the terms and conditions of a loan, grant or guarantee which require approval by the National
Assembly before it is executed.
The court in reading Articles 63(2)(d) and 207 together held that there isn’t a mandatory
requirement in the Constitution for the executive to submit all loans, to the National Assembly
for approval before they are contracted. According to the court, only loans of a certain nature
or category and their terms and conditions require prior approval of the National Assembly,
not all public debt contraction.
Based on the above, the majority of the Constitutional court refused to hold that there was a
breach of the Constitution because there is no requirement that the Government of the Republic
of Zambia should present all loans contracted to the National Assembly for prior approval.
The majority of the Constitutional Court also held that the Loans and Guarantees
(Authorisation) Act should be amended to be brought in line with Article 207(1) and (2) of the
Constitution which requires legislation to provide the category, nature and other and terms and
conditions for a loan, grant or guarantee that requires approval of the National Assembly.
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According to the court, the amendment to the Act will enable the National Assembly to
effectively exercise it oversight of the executive’s role in contracting public debt.
According to the majority, in relation to the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act, the
majority decision of the court refused to declare the Act unconstitutional due to the failure to
specify which provision contravene the Constitution.
The dissenting opinion penned by Justice Munalula took the view that a proper interpretation
of Articles 63(2)(d) read together with Article 207 is that Article 207(2) merely seeks to set the
standard for what legislation should contain but that the National Assembly retains the
authoritative powers to approve public debt and that is constitutional function that is necessary
for legitimate public loan contraction. According to the dissenting opinion, there is no proviso
to the power of the National Assembly to approve.
According to the minority opinion, the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act is
comprehensive enough to cover what is envisaged by Article 207 of the Constitution and thus
its application in the interim would not be unconstitutional. Justice Munalula bemoaned the
failure to enact new legislation in the last 5 years to deal with public debt contraction despite
various other pieces of legislation being passed.
Significance
The Constitutional Court has repeated on several occasions in cases such Steven Katuka and
Others v. the Attorney-General and Others 2 and the Public Protector for the Republic of
Zambia v. Indeni Petroleum Refinery Company Limited 3 that the primary principle of
interpretation is that the meaning of the text should be derived from the plain meaning of the
language used. Specifically, in the Public Protector for the Republic of Zambia case, the court
held that: In other words, where the words of any provision are clear and unambiguous, they
must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would lead to absurdity or be in
conflict with other provisions of the Constitution.
The holding above makes it clear that when the Constitution is interpreted, the meaning of each
provision should be construed in such a manner that it gives effect to the ordinary meaning of
the words – unless it would lead to an absurdity or conflict with other provisions of the
Constitution.
In Zambia National Commercial Bank Plc v. Martin Musonda and Others 4, the Constitutional
Court dealt with the issue of what rules should govern the Industrial Relations Division of the
High Court given that the Constitution made the court a division of the High Court, but new
rules had not been promulgated to give effect to this change. In this regard, the Court stated
that: A further principle of constitutional interpretation is that all the relevant provisions
bearing on the subject for interpretation should be considered together as a whole in
order to give effect to the objective of the Constitution. (emphasis author’s)
10 and 11 of 2016 [2017]
1 of 2018 [2019]
4
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According to the court in Martin Musonda, the Constitution should be read so that all matters
touching on the matter which is the subject of interpretation are considered. This is important
because all interpretation of Constitutional provisions should be guided by the need to give
effect to objectives of the Constitution.
Article 63(2)(d) of the Constitution makes it very clear the National Assembly shall oversee
the performance of executive functions by approving public debt before it is contracted. Article
63(2)(d) is couched in mandatory terms. In Matilda Mutale v. the Attorney General and
Emmanuel Munaile 5, the Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret the meaning of “shall”
in legislation and held that where the word does not carry any technical meaning to require
further elaboration as to the true intention of the legislature, the word “shall” should be
interpreted as being mandatory.
Where a power is assigned to a body or decision-maker in terms of legislation, only that party
is permitted to exercise that power. The Supreme Court in Embassy Supermarket v. Union Bank
(in liquidation) was clear that: where a statute places duty on an individual or officer no other person shall
perform that duty unless it is so provided for under the same law
Based on the above and a literal reading of Article 63(2)(d) of the Constitution, the power to
approve debt vests in National Assembly and there is no proviso or exceptions to this power.
Based on the Embassy Supermarket case, the National Assembly is the sole body tasked with
approving public debt and thus approval is needed for all public debt, contrary to the position
taken.
Therefore, the view of the majority of the Constitutional Court is incorrect. The mere fact that
Article 207(2)(a) requires legislation to provide the category, nature and other terms and
conditions of public debt that need approval by the National Assembly does not mean that the
National Assembly does not have oversight over all public debt.
Nothing in Article 63(2)(d) nor Article 207 suggests that there are exceptions to the need for
National Assembly approval and thus the court was wrong in this regard. This is clear from the
wording of Article 114 which states that the Executive must recommend loans or guarantees
on loans for the approval of the National Assembly. This clearly illustrates that the National
Assembly has the mandate to approve all public debt when Articles 63(2)(d) and 114(1)(e) are
read together. Had the Constitutional Court taken this approach, a different outcome would
have been reached.
The Constitution merely requires legislation to provide specific provision not exceptions to the
role of National Assembly. In other words, the requirement that the National Assembly must
approve public debt is unqualified and not subject to any proviso and any legislation that would
be contrary to this position would be unconstitutional. In this regard based on the Constitution
itself, the National Assembly is mandated to approve all public debt, contrary to the position
taken by the court.
Crucially Article 63(2)(d) is subject to Article 207(2)(a) of the Constitution which states that:
5
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(2) Legislation enacted under clause (1) shall provide—
(a) for the category, nature and other terms and conditions of a loan, grant or
guarantee, that will require the approval by the National Assembly before the
loan, grant or guarantee is executed
The above makes it clear that legislation should be enacted to provide for the category, nature
and other terms and conditions of a loan, grant or guarantee, that will require the approval by
the National Assembly. This is an important provision which illustrates that in addition to the
general power given to the National Assembly to approve public debt, legislation needs to be
enacted to outline the categories, nature, terms, and conditions of the public debt that will
require approval.
For these reasons, the Constitutional Court was correct when they held that the two provisions
had to be read together to properly give meaning to the objectives of the Constitution. Based
on their analysis of these provisions, the Constitutional Court concluded that there is no
mandatory requirement in Article 63(2)(d) of the Constitution to submit all loans for approval
to the National Assembly.
However, the majority decision of the Constitution Court failed to take into consideration
Articles 8 (e), 9(1) and 267 (1) of the Constitution which are relevant to the case at hand.
Article 8(e) provides good governance and integrity as one of the core national values and
principles. Article 9(1) states that: (1) The national values and principles shall apply to the —
(a) interpretation of this Constitution;
(b) enactment and interpretation of the law; and
(c) development and implementation of State policy
Further, Article 267 (1) of the Constitution provides that: (1) This Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Bill of Rights
and in a manner that—
(a) promotes its purposes, values and principles;
(b) permits the development of the law; and
(c) contributes to good governance.
A perusal of the Constitution reveals that notwithstanding identifying the correct rules of
application, the courts failed to consider other relevant provisions of the Constitution relating
to the value and principle of good governance. The above provisions make it clear that when
the Constitution is interpreted, good governance and integrity, which is a core national value
and principle should be considered.
The fact that the Constitutional Court reached a conclusion that there isn’t a mandatory
requirement to submit all loans to the National Assembly for approval does not seem to be in
line with Article 63(2)(d) which is couched in mandatory terms. Clearly, the intention of the
drafters of the Constitution was that the National Assembly should have oversight over all
public debt as a matter of good governance, and separation of powers. Such a power does not
vest in the Executive. To this end, the minority opinion penned by Justice Munalula is more
convincing in this regard. Munalula JC stated that:
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…there is no alternative meaning to Article 207 purporting to give power to
the Executive to pursue a different mode of contracting loans contrary to the
mandate given to the National Assembly in Article 63(2) (d). The power to
borrow is given to Government as a whole with each arm of Government
performing its own constitutional function in the collaborative process of
legitimate public loan contraction. The National Assembly is given
authoritative powers.
The court’s failure to consider the principles of good governance in reaching it decision means
that the majority decision, unlike the dissenting opinion, did not apply its mind to the failure to
present certain loans in terms of the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act to the National
Assembly. Had the Constitutional Court properly applied the values and principles, they would
have reached the conclusion that the dissenting opinion did that there isn’t a proviso to Article
63(2)(d) of the Constitution as the National Assembly has the authoritative powers over public
debt.
The failure by the Constitutional Court should have taken these provisions into consideration
when interpreting Articles 63(2)(d) and 207(1) and (2) was a misdirection. This is important
because the Constitutional court itself conceded that Cabinet, in other words, the Government
of the Republic of Zambia has no power to approve the contraction of public debt. If Cabinet
cannot approve the contraction of public debt, it means that only the National Assembly has
the power to approve public debt
When interpreting Articles 63(2)(d) and 207 of the Constitution, the majority decision of the
court did not adequately consider Article 114(1)(e) of the Constitution. The court at J39 stated
that:
Thus, any assertion that the Cabinet has the power to approve the contraction of debt
by the State is not supported by the Constitution.
The above statement is true and correct because in terms of Article 114(1)(e), the role of
Cabinet is to recommend loans and guarantees on loans to be contracted to the National
Assembly. The provision does not state that all loans should be referred for approval. Our
understanding is that this is to support Article 207(2) which states that legislation should
prescribe with loans will require approval. This supports the view that the Constitutional Court
was incorrect when they held that not all loans require approval from the National Assembly.
The Constitutional Court makes two conflicting statements when they state that the National
Assembly is not responsible for approving all public debt, but on the other hand also state that
Cabinet cannot approve public debt. If Cabinet cannot approve public debt as they only have
the power to recommend to the National Assembly, the import of Articles 63(2)(d) and
114(1)(e) is that the National Assembly has the power to approve all loans, grants or guarantees
as there aren’t any exceptions or provisions to Articles 63(2)(d). It was thus a misdirection on
the part of the court to hold otherwise.
The Constitutional Court did not apply its mind to who approve public debt outside the realm
of National Assembly approval. This is important because considering the above statement of
the majority is correct, it is rather confusing that the Constitutional Court did not deal with the
issue of debt that was contracted that required National Assembly approval.
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The court decided to limit its interpretation to whether all public debt needed approval. The
court should have extended its interpretation to adequately discuss the failure by the Minister
of Finance to submit the relevant public debt contracted since 5th January 2016 to the National
Assembly. This would have required the court to discuss the adequacy of the Loans and
Guarantees (Authorisation) Act and how it applies in the transition period before new
legislation is enacted. This is important because under the principles of good governance, issues
relating to public debt should have been dealt with comprehensively to give clarity to the
executive on their duties, particularly in relation to public debt that does not need National
Assembly approval.
Having held that the National Assembly does not oversight over all public debt, it would have
been prudent for the Constitutional court to deal with this grey area given that there is certain
public debt that the National Assembly does not need to approve, but Article 114(1)(e) does
not permit Cabinet to approve the contraction of debt. This is an important aspect of
constitutional interpretation given that any new legislation will have to comply with the
Constitution and guidance given by the court. As outlined above, the principle of good
governance which is intended to guide the interpretation of the Constitution would have been
met had the court addressed its mind to the same.
The failure of the Constitutional court to deal with the issue raised above goes to show that
Article 63(2)(d) requires the National Assembly to approve all public debt, contrary to the
position taken by the court. It is thus a misdirection to hold that because Article 207(2)(a)
requires legislation to provide for the category, nature and other terms and conditions of a loan,
grant or guarantee, that will require the approval by the National Assembly before the loan,
grant or guarantee is executed, does not mean that the contracting of certain public debt is
beyond the purview of the National Assembly. The Article merely seeks to give guidance on
what legislation should contain to enable the National Assembly to properly carry out its
functions and not to exempt certain debt from legislative oversight.
Moving to the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act which is currently in force is
competent enough to subsist during the transition period prior to the enactment of a new Act.
In any case, a perusal of the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act illustrates that although
it is not strictly in line with Article 63(2)(d) of the Constitution, it does provide the category,
nature, and terms of conditions of loans. It expressly states that all public borrowing is regulated
by the Act except for loans under the Bretton Woods Agreement, the International
Development Association Act; the general Loans (International Bank) Act; or the Development
Bond Act.
Furthermore, a perusal of the rest of the Act indicates that it covers various issues such as debt
charged, treasury bills, the power of the Minister to raise loans as he deems necessary.
Crucially, section 29 of the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act is clear that no loans
shall be raised for or on behalf of the Government except under the authority of the Act or any
written law enacted. In terms of the Constitution, this is National Assembly approval for debt
identified as requiring approval in the Act.
Based on the above, the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act is comprehensive and
covers the matters required in Article 207(2) of the Constitution. For these reasons,
notwithstanding need for amendment to Act given the enactment of the amendment to the
Constitution, the Act gives effect to need for National Assembly approval by virtue of section
29 of the Act.
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The Act also outlines the specific exceptions to public debt contracting and these are valid
given that the National Assembly also approved Zambia’s membership or entitlement to
borrow from the organisations mentioned in Article 2 and thus further approval is not required.
Furthermore, according to the Act, all other debt must be contracted in terms of section 29 and
this feeds into the requirement for approval by the National Assembly.
It was thus incorrect for the Constitutional Court to hold that there is no mandatory requirement
to submit all loans to the National Assembly for approval when a few pages earlier the court
conceded that:
The purpose of Article 63(2)(d) is merely to assign to the National Assembly the
function of approving public debt before it is contracted.
Without prejudice to the above, if we were to assume that the Loans and Guarantees
(Authorisation) Act is not comprehensive enough to fit into what is envisaged under Article
207(2) of the Constitution, the Martin Musonda case, the Constitutional Court had the occasion
to discuss what occurs prior to the enactment of legislation as required by the Constitutional
Court. The court had this to say:
We take judicial notice that the processes, procedures, jurisdiction, powers and the
sittings of the created divisions of the High Court have not yet been prescribed after
the enactment of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016. The
question therefore, is what rules should the Industrial Relations Court Division
follow in the interim (in the transition period) as regards its processes, procedures,
jurisdiction, powers and sittings? The answer lies in section 6(1) of the Constitution
of Zambia Act No. 1 of 2016 which provides as follows:
Subject to the other provisions of this Act, and so far as they are not inconsistent with
the Constitution as amended, existing laws shall continue in force after the
commencement of this Act as if they had been made in pursuance of the constitution
as amended, but shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations,
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with
the Constitution as amended. It is with this in mind that we agree with the argument
by the Respondents that the transitional provisions as provided for under section 6
(1) of the Constitution of Zambia Act No. 1 of 2016 apply to the Industrial Relations
Court Division until specific rules of procedure for the Court are prescribed.
The court went further to hold that:
Until new legislation is enacted to provide for the processes and procedures and
jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Court Division pursuant to Article 120 (3) (a)
and (b) of the Constitution as amended, the Court continues to use the existing
processes and procedures and enjoys the same jurisdiction.
The Judgment of the Constitutional Court above in Martin Musonda is crucial because it
explains that during the transition period, prior to the enactment of legislation to give effect to
a constitutional provision, any legislation that is in place stands and should apply, to the extent
that it doesn’t conflict with the Constitution.
Therefore, the Martin Musonda judgment is clear that in the interim existing legislation
continues to apply to the extent that the application is not contrary to the Constitution. As
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illustrated above, there is nothing in the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act to indicate
that its application during the transition period would be contrary to the Constitution.
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